and have a proliferation of international criminal gangs that target and victimize many UAC. 7 Additionally, many UAC come to the U.S. seeking reunification with family members, mostly parents, who have emigrated earlier. 8 These factors motivating UAC to leave their home country and enter the U.S. underlie the legal questions regarding how justice is given to UAC when they enter into the U.S. immigration system. The complexity of immigration proceedings, especially for a class of noncitizens who are vulnerable to the inherent coercive nature of the proceedings, necessitate an analysis of the legal issues surrounding UAC. ('DOJ') was responsible for the care and custody of UAC arrested in the U.S. who were suspected of being deportable and who had no responsible parent or legal guardian. 10 The INS were also tasked with prosecuting removal proceedings against UAC in immigration courts.
Over the past decade, an increased number of arrested UAC could not be released on bond or recognizance because INS could not determine whether any person was available to provide care pending deportation proceedings.
11
In response to the increased flow of UAC into California, the INS Western Regional
Office adopted a policy of limiting the release of detained minors to 'a parent or lawful guardian', except in 'unusual and extraordinary cases' allowing release to 'a responsible individual' who agrees to provide for the care, welfare, and wellbeing of the child. 12 Four UAC filed a class action in the District Court for the Central District of California on behalf of all aliens under the age of 18 detained by the INS Western Region because a parent or legal guardian failed 'to personally appear to take custody of them'. 13 Pending litigation, INS adopted a modified rule allowing alien juveniles to be released to a: (1) parent; (2) legal guardian; or (2) adult relative (e.g., brother, sister, aunt, uncle, grandparent), unless the INS determined that detention was necessary to ensure the UAC's safety or appearance in deportation proceedings.
14 The district court in Reno v. Flores later approved a consent decree that settled all claims regarding UAC's detention conditions (the 'Flores Settlement'). 15 The Flores Settlement 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 ('HHS'). 18 The Flores Settlement provided that unless detention was necessary to ensure a child's safety or his appearance in immigration court, he must be released without unnecessary delay to a parent or legal guardian. 19 Juveniles who are not released must, within 72 hours of arrest, be placed in juvenile care facilities that 'meet or exceed state licensing requirements for the provision of services to dependent children'. 20 Studies indicate that the mental health of UAC depend on the degree of trauma and acculturation upon migration into the country of refuge. 21 Hence, the necessity of release and placement is essential to the wellbeing of the UAC. 22 21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60   F  o  r  P  e  e  r  R  e  v  i  e  w   8 specialized juvenile program or facility if the ORR determines that he or she 'poses a danger to self or others' or committed a criminal offense. 31 The ORR was also required under the law to conduct monthly reviews of any placement of a UAC in a secure facility.
Under current ORR policies, field specialists initially determine whether to detain or release unaccompanied minors ('ORR Policies'). 32 Before placing the UAC with a potential custodian, the ORR must: (1) ascertain whether the proposed custodian can provide for the minor's physical and mental well-being; and, (2) determine the necessity of a home study. 33 The immigration judge terminated the removal proceedings against R.M.B. because he had already been granted deferred action.
51
The Fourth Circuit held that R.M.B. is a UAC based on the ORR's assessment that his mother was incapable of providing for his physical and mental well-being. 52 The authority of ORR to detain R.M.B. did not cease upon termination of removal proceedings against him because ORR was specifically required by law to determine whether a proposed custodian can provide for the UAC's physical and mental well-being (the 'suitable custodian requirement').
53
The Fourth Circuit held that the suitable custodian requirement is an exception to the general rule that an alien cannot be detained upon termination of immigration proceedings against him.
54
According to the Fourth Circuit, the case involved 'perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests', specifically, the fundamental right of parents to provide 'care, custody, and 60 The district ordered R.M.B.'s release to care and custody of his mother and held that: (1) mother and child had a fundamental liberty interest in family integrity, which was protected by procedural due process; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of petitioner's fundamental liberty interests required ORR to ensure due process in its procedures for family reunification; and (3) the governmental interest involved was not sufficient to rule that ORR was not required to implement additional measures to guaranty procedural due process. 63 Here, petitioner and R.M.B. were separated for nearly three years. While in the custody of the ORR, R.M.B. was held in juvenile detention facilities, the most restrictive placement. As a result, the mother has been deprived of 'meaningful contact with her son'.
64
The district court then examined the adequacy of ORR procedures for placement of UAC with suitable custodians. 65 Here, the ORR ordered a home study upon submission of the family reunification form by the mother. The home study recommended against releasing R.M.B. to petitioner's care because of R.M.B.'s behavioral problems instead of the mother's parental fitness. 66 A month after the home study, petitioner received a short letter stating that her request was denied because R.M.B. required an environment with a 'high level of supervision and structure'. 67 The district court concluded that the ORR process was deficient because the proceedings were unilateral and petitioner was not informed of the evidence or the facts relied upon. Under Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit precedent, the state has the 'burden to initiate proceedings to justify its action' once it withholds a child from a parent's care. 68 Adversarial hearings are required when 'subjective judgments' that are 'peculiarly susceptible to error' are disputed. 69 The determination of whether a proposed custodian can provide for a UAC's physical and mental well-being is a 'complex and subjective inquiry'. 70 The court concluded that ORR 77 The court opined that 'a more fulsome process'
would 'considerably lessen the risk of an erroneous deprivation' of the fundamental interest in family reunification.
78
The court identified key deficiencies in the ORR process. First, the ORR did not adequately explain the reasons for its decision. Second, the ORR process 'improperly placed the burden of initiation and persuasion on the petitioner'. 79 The burden should be on ORR to show the necessity of continued custody of the UAC rather than on the parent to show the propriety of release. 80 Third, there were 'very lengthy delays' in the ORR's processing of the petition for reunification.
81
The 'egregious' 17-months delay before the ORR decided on the initial application for reunification violated due process. 82 The court also noted that because of this delay, O.G.L.S.'s psychological condition worsened while in placement. Fourth, no hearing was conducted before an impartial judge.
Right to the bond hearing of the Flores settlement
In Plaintiffs 'do not possess rights equivalent to those of criminal defendants' because 'deportation proceedings are civil in nature'. 104 In deportation proceedings, a UAC cannot invoke the exclusionary rule, 105 Miranda warnings, 106 and the right to appointed counsel. 107 The court asserted that 'the risk of erroneous deprivation is great' especially for UAC who are 'not arrested near the border' or are not permanent residents of Mexico or Canada. 
Issues concerning asylum applications

Right of third parties to custody of the unaccompanied alien child
An asylum application cannot be filed by a six-year-old unaccompanied minor or his relative who does not have legal custody, if the parent of the UAC opposes the application. 118 Third parties who are not related to the UAC cannot gain custody of the minor or be appointed as custodians by a state juvenile court without the consent of the Secretary of the DHS. 
Minority age at the time of the application for asylum
The TVPRA exempts UAC from the one-year time limitation for filing an asylum application.
120
To qualify for the TVPRA's jurisdictional provision, the applicants must qualify as UAC at the time they file an asylum application even if he or she turned eighteen years old thereafter.
121
Minors who do not qualify as UAC upon filing of the asylum application were 'not statutorily exempted' from the one-year time limit. 
Right to request consent for a state juvenile court's jurisdiction
The DHS and not the ORR has authority to grant a UAC's request for consent to a state juvenile long-term scheme' to secure United States citizenship for him, his father, and brother. 136 The
Third Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision due to the 'long-standing practice of allowing the District Director broad discretion in immigration matters'. 
Issues concerning removal proceedings
Right to counsel at government expense
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had the opportunity to consider whether UAC have the right to counsel at government expense in removal proceedings in J.E.F.M. v. Lynch. 138 The
Ninth Circuit, however, only considered the jurisdictional issue and declined to decide the case on the merits. Here, UAC aged 3 to 17 years old filed an action alleging that they were statutorily and constitutionally entitled to have government-appointed counsel 'at government expense' during removal proceedings. 139 The Ninth Circuit held that a district court does not have jurisdiction over a claim that UAC have a right to government-appointed counsel in removal proceedings. Plaintiff minors 'cannot bypass the immigration courts and proceed directly to [the] district court'. 140 They must 'exhaust the administrative process' before accessing the federal courts. 141 Congress expressly provided that all claims, statutory or constitutional, 'arising from' immigration removal proceedings 'can only be brought through the petition for review process in the federal courts of appeals'. 142 Right-to-counsel claims are 'routinely raised in petitions for review filed with a federal court of appeals'. 143 Federal courts of appeals could review only the The Ninth Circuit continued that immigration judges 'have an obligation to ask whether a petitioner wants counsel'. 145 Although immigration judges are not required to 'undertake Herculean efforts' to grant petitioners the right to counsel, 'at a minimum' they must determine:
(1) whether the petitioner wants counsel; (2) a reasonable period for obtaining counsel; and, (3) assess the voluntariness of any waiver. 146 The Ninth Circuit stated that the failure of an immigration judge to inquire whether the petitioner wanted or knowingly waived counsel 'is grounds for reversal'.
147
In Nehimaya-Guerra v. Gonzales, the Ninth Circuit held that the minor was denied due process during the removal proceeding: (1) when the immigration judge conducted a group hearing of fifteen individuals and did not inquire as to plaintiff's status as a minor; and, (2) when plaintiff admitted removability because she was not represented by an adult or legal counsel.
148
The Department of Justice ('DOJ') guidelines require 'special treatment' of a UAC and prohibit immigration judges from accepting 'an admission of removability' from UAC who are not accompanied by an 'attorney or legal representative, a near relative, legal guardian, or friend'. 
Right to a bond rehearing upon rearrest on allegations of gang membership
In Saravia v. Sessions, the District Court for the Northern District of California issued a preliminary injunction requiring the government to grant a hearing before an immigration judge to any UAC previously placed with a sponsor but rearrested on allegations of gang activity. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 Plaintiffs were previously arrested as unaccompanied minors, transferred to ORR custody, and released to either parents or sponsors because of the ORR's prior determination that they were not dangerous. Upon rearrest by ICE on suspicion of gang affiliation, they were placed in juvenile detention facilities, the most restrictive secure facility level. The district court required the government '(g)oing forward, at least while this lawsuit is pending' to provide the plaintiffs with notice of the basis for rearrest and an opportunity to rebut evidence in 'a hearing within seven days of arrest of any such minor'. 152 Venue for the hearing must be 'in the jurisdiction where the minor has been arrested or where the minor lives'.
153
The court noted that federal agents have been arresting noncitizens, including UAC previously placed with sponsors, 'based on allegations of gang involvement'. 154 Adult aliens may be released on bond or parole pending removal proceedings as long as the federal government determines that they do not pose a danger to the community or are not a flight risk. Once released on bond, the law prohibits federal agents from rearresting the alien 'merely because he is subject to removal proceedings'. 155 The government must 'present evidence of materially changed circumstances' that the alien 'is in fact dangerous or has become a flight risk, or is now subject to a final order of removal'. 156 The alien is entitled under federal laws and current DHS policies 'to a prompt hearing before an immigration judge' to dispute the notion that 'changed circumstances justify his rearrest'. 157 The protections as alien adults released on bond because they are not given a 'prompt hearing' to dispute that their detention is justified 'based on changed circumstances'. 158 The government instead transferred the minors to high-security facilities for an indefinite period.
The court then applied the Mathews v. Eldridge standard to determine the due process requirements in the case. 159 Here, the plaintiffs have a 'strong interest' under the Fifth Amendment due process clause 'in being free from unnecessary government interference with their liberty'. 160 Since some of the plaintiff UAC were in the custody of their parents when they were rearrested and transferred to detention facilities, the government's actions triggered the 'long-recognized interest' of a parent in 'the companionship, care, custody and management of his or her children'. 161 UAC previously placed by the ORR with a sponsor cannot be rearrested 'solely on the ground that he is subject to removal proceedings'. 162 A lawful arrest must be based on evidence of changed circumstances, indicating that the UAC pose a danger to self or the community or present a flight risk. The UAC and their sponsors 'have the right to participate in a prompt hearing before an immigration judge' to contest the government's allegation of 'changed circumstances'. 163 The court stated that the government violated the due process rights of the UAC by indefinitely detaining then in high-security facilities without providing them a hearing.
Without 'a prompt adversarial hearing', there is a 'serious risk' that minors previously placed by ORR with sponsors will be rearrested based on 'insufficiently substantial allegations of gang affiliation' and 'erroneously placed into ORR custody'. 164 The ('Bivens action'), claiming monetary damages for violation of their constitutional rights. 176 They alleged that they were physically or sexually abused while detained in the Nixon facility.
The Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiffs failed to prove that defendants were deliberately indifferent to their Fifth Amendment due process rights to be protected from harm because 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 The government argued that the plaintiff 'has the burden of extracting herself' from the ORR's custody if she 'wants to exercise the right to an abortion'. 186 According to the government, a UAC may obtain an abortion only if: (1) she finds a sponsor willing to and legally qualified to obtain custody of her; or (2) she voluntarily returns to her home country. The concurring opinion countered that this position is untenable because under U.S. Supreme Court precedent, the government may not impose 'substantial and unjustified obstacles' to a woman's exercise of her right to an abortion 'pre-viability'. evidence on the feasibility of family reunification and release of the minor to the parent's custody.
Case law examining the rights of UAC prior to voluntary departure emphasize the need to grant them the opportunity to consult with a responsible adult, including a lawyer from a free legal services list that should be provided to them. Also, the minor must be aware of and understand the consequences of voluntary departure prior to signing the voluntary departure form. The minor, for instance, must be aware that upon availing of voluntary departure, he or she waives the right to deportation hearing. Waiver of these rights must be knowing and intentional.
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